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Appellant's

Reply

Appellee's counsel uses the Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker Motto of: always
deny as much information as possible; then obtain as much information as is
possible.
Like the over zealous, and unethical prosecutor who must "win at all
costs" in order to preserve his public image as "tough on crime"; the
Appellee's counsel must "win at all costs" to preserve their "never lose to
an employee" image in order to preserve their image for Utah business and
industrial clients.
May the Appeal Court Judges keep in mind, that completely fair and
just adjudication is never possible when premature summary judgements are
awarded. When discovery has been denied, issues cannot be clearly defined,
and resolution of disputes is based on politics rather than judicial reasoning.
Appellee's counsel has simply ignored the issues clearly raised in
Appellant's Brief, page 5.
1. Appellant's First Issue Asks on page 5 of Appellant's Brief:
"Can Utah employers assign an employee to
accomplish tasks and responsibilities the same
as other employees who are paid at a much
higher grade and pay?"
Appellee's answers, on page 7, of Appellee's brief:
"Has Plaintiff raised any valid appellate issues
arising from the summary judgment motions
granted by Judge Glasmann and Judge Dutson?"
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Does the Appeal Court permit question in lieu of answers?

2. Appellant's Second Issue asks on page 5 of Appellant's Brief:
"Can Utah employers claiming
protection under "Employment at Will" falsely
accuse an employee of a criminal act, terminate
the employee based upon the accusation,
damage the employee's current and future
employment potential, but never permit the
employee to question or challenge the false
allegation?"
Appellee's answer on page 8, of Appellee's Brief:
" If this court were to find that Plaintiff has
raised any issues arising from the summary
judgment motion, did Plaintiff satisfy her
burden of avoiding summary judgment by
coming forward with specific, admissible,
evidence showing that there were genuine
disputes of material facts such that
summary judgment was not appropriate?"
When the Court denied Plaintiff's Attorney discovery when new
evidence information become know to him, he and his client suffered
serious discretionary abuse.

3. Appellant's Third Issue asks on page 6, of Appellant's Brief:
" Can an assigned Judge, who replaces a Judge
removed from the Bench for gross misconduct,
refuse to consider rulings by the former Judge?"
Appellee's answer on page 8, of Appellee's Brief:
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(Appellee makes no attempt to answer Plaintiff's
Third Issue, at all)
When Judge Dutson refused to consider Judge Glasmann's Rulings, it
was before Judge Glasmann was removed from the Bench. However.
Judge Dutson. without doubt, had been covering-up for Judge
Glasmann's misconduct for years. Forcing a ruling made bv a
knowingly compromised Judge was unfair, injudicious, discretionary
abuse.
4. Appellant's following Reply is directed to specific statements
found in Appellee's Brief:
a. Appellee states on page 7 of Appellee's Brief, under
Jurisdiction:
" . . . [Plaintiff] raises in her brief, appear to address
issues decided in a separate case she brought against Autoiiv ASP, Inc.
("Autoiiv") in Federal Court."
Appellant's Reply.

Appellee's counsel tries to distort case

perception and history by confusing Title VII Civil Rights discrimination
charges with the state charges that were filed by the Appellant, Pro
se, several months before the federal case was filed.
Appellant/Plaintiff received a Right To Sue letter from the
EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) in April of 1998,
over a month after her suit had been filed in the Second District Court.
The Federal Suit, Title VII , discrimination complaint, had to be filed in
Federal Court within 90 days. It was filed by Appellant on June 29,
1998, when Mr. John Caine, agreed to represent her in this State Case
only.
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Plaintiff was advised by her attorney Mr. Caine and others
that she must file the civil rights discrimination case in the Federal
District Court, and that it was not within the jurisdiction of the state
court. This is confirmed by Mr. Caine in exhibit #40, of Appellant's
Addendum, and in court record. (R. 851-863)
Mr. Caine's office inadvertently separated and filed his
pleading Reply To Defendants Motion In Opposition, from the exhibits in
support of the pleading. These were inadvertently filed on 7 August,
2000. (R, 790-850)
Until the Defendants counsel used excerpts from the
federal case depositions, Mr. Caine was unaware of the facts that took
place during Plaintiffs employment prior to her termination. When he
did become aware of such facts, he ask for court reporter's deposition
copy. This had, however, been withheld due to defendants counsel
instructions to the court reporter on the payments of costs. These
costs at the time were beyond the plaintiffs financial capabilities. (R.
791-795) (Exh. #40)
b. Appellee states on page 7 of Appellee's Brief. "These claims
and issues were never a part of the State's action that is presumably
the subject of this appeal. New claims or issues cannot be raised on
appeal."
Appellant's Reply:

These are not new issues, they are just

issues that were not made known to the Plaintiffs attorney, who was
retained several months after the Plaintiff had filed her complaint in
the Second District Court.
When the Right To Sue letter was received by Plaintiff, she
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and her attorney separated those claims he thought were State
claims, and those that he felt were Federal Civil Rights claims.
These were not new claims at all. They were claims for
which he was un-aware until defendant's counsel mentioned them in
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment in this State case. These
were not Title VII, Civil Rights, complaint claims.
For example: the employer, Autoliv Inc. falsely accused
Plaintiff of the criminal act of "fraud and misrepresentation of hours
worked," (Appellant's Brief, Add. Exh. #23)
Because Autoliv Inc. Has no ADR (Administrative Dispute
Resolution) program, Plaintiff was not permitted to challenge the
accusation, face her accusers, or examine them under oath.

Plaintiff

was denied adjudication of such career damaging accusations.
Accusations of fraud and misrepresentation in her career field was
devastating. The federal.Title VII suit and claim, was based on Plaintiff
being subjected to discriminatory treatment due to her gender and her
national origin.
The Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Second
District Court as a pro se litigant. As such, the court ignored her
pleadings. Her efforts to obtain discovery were ignored. At the same
time, she was over burdened with interrogatory requests, some 97 in
number. (R. 1 2 4 - 143)
When she appealed to the court to compel discovery, and
relief from a 97 question interrogatory, the court ignored her
pleadings. As a result, when her attorney took over the case, he was
unable to obtain data that should have been included in the record.

8

(R. 153-156)
Defendant's counsel, represented Autoliv in both the
federal and state cases. They were privy to all of the data that had
been accumulated for both the State and the Federal Courts.

This

information was unknown to the Plaintiff's attorney until such time as
Defendant's counsel used deposition extracts from the federal case in
their Motion for Summary Judgment in this State case. It was the
Defendant's use of the information in their Motion for Summary
Judgment that brought it to the Plaintiff's attorney's attention, and
legally into the State case litigation. The Court allowed Defendant's
counsel to use such federal case information; but when Plaintiff's
Attorney wanted to use information from the same federal case
transcripts, and to take depositions of Autoliv defendants, the court
refused. This was an abuse of discretion, and totally unfair to
Plaintiff.
c. Appellee states on page 22 of Appellee's Brief: "Although
Plaintiff was represented throughout the state action, she is pursuing
this appeal pro se,

" A s a general rule, a party who represents

himself will be held to the same standards of knowledge, and practice
as a qualified member of the bar. . . ."
Appellant's Reply: Appellee's statement is incorrect. Defendant
counsel knows that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 2, 1998, acting
in her own behalf, pro se. She was not represented by counsel until
June 22, 1998. Between March 2, 1998, and June 22, 1998, Plaintiff
was unable to obtain discovery, and unable to get the court to act on
her pleadings, including Motion to Compel Discovery, and for Protective
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Order. (R. 73-95 and, R. 124-143 and, 144-152)
Then, after having been told that Title VII, Employment
Discrimination Complaints must be filed in Federal District Court, Mr.
Caine agreed to represent her only in this State Defamation case.
While, Appellee mentions requirement for pro se litigants to meet
standards for Bar members, the Court should also recognize that Bar
members should extend Pro se's litigants the same courtesy and
procedurally correct treatment as they do other Bar members. And
the goal of the courts should be to provide fairness and justice, and
not just Bar member's welfare. Everyone knows that Judges are
lawyers. And any reasonable person knows that a pro se litigant faces
an extreme handicap. Whenever Judges must be reminded of their
professional affiliation, by large law firm lawyers, there is reason to
suspect their honesty.
Defendant's counsel created every kind of expense for an
unemployed pro se litigant, faced with sudden financial difficulties that
were heaped upon her and her family as a result of malicious, false
accusations and inconsiderate actions.
Not long after Attorney Caine took over this State case, Plaintiff
was advised that Mr. Caine may not be trustworthy.

Mr. John Morris

a legal representative for Defendants in the Federal case advised
Plaintiff's in-laws that a deal had been arranged between Mr. Caine and
Defendant's lead legal counsel. Mr. Caine denied the allegation, and Mr.
Morris left the Defendant's law firm. (See Exh. # 2 1 , para. 5, of
Appellant's Brief Addendum)
It should be noted in exhibit # 2 1 , an effort was made to obtain
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the audio tape recordings of the discussions of the court with the
parties. Judge Glasmann had not made such tape recordings of such
discussions, which was in violation of the Utah Rules Of Procedure,
4-106, Rules of Judicial Administration.
d. The Appellees' states on page 11 of Appellee's Brief: "That
on October 12, 1999, the federal lawsuit was dismissed in its entirety
on summary judgment by federal district Judge, Dale A. Kimball."
Appellant's Reply: As all honest legal professionals know, there
can be no fair, impartial, and complete adjudication when only one side
has been permitted to obtain discovery. Such professionals know that
issues still in dispute must be resolved before summary judgment is
appropriate. Defendant's counsel, with the support of tainted Judges,
has eliminated this concept and has openly violates FRCP Rule 56,
which parallels URCP Rule 56.
An example of this summary judgment abuse was illustrated in
Judge Kimball's Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 12, 1999.
Judge Kimball states in footnote 3, page 5, "According to the
Defendants, this video tape does not exist." This statement,
compared to transcript of proceeding on September 1, 1999, Plaintiff
Eddy, on page 1 6, lines 21-25, and on page 17, lines 1 -4, and on page
19, lines 1-9, clearly described the secret video taping that had taken
place. THIS TAPE IS AVAILABLE AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN. The issue
was still in dispute and should have prevented summary judgment.
Another example of Judge Kimball's prejudice against pro se
litigants is described on page 2, of Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Judge Kimball states: "Defendants determined that she [Christina
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Eddy] was not qualified for this job." But then on page 26, lines 24-25,
of the transcript, Judge Kimball asks Defendants counsel: "why did
they give her a trial run on the job if she wasn't qualified for it?"
Again, an issue that was still in dispute was ignored and summary
judgment was awarded.
e. Appellee states on page 8 of Appellee's Brief: "Plaintiff must
marshall her evidence by setting forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issues for trial, and these facts must be supported
by the record and constitute admissible evidence."
Appellant's Reply:

Defendants counsel selected pages from

federal case depositions that supported their case, but omitted pages
that clearly supported Plaintiffs case. These federal case depositions
were not available to Plaintiff's Attorney in the State case. Like
politicians in a political campaign, Defense counsel selects bits and
pieces, distorts the total picture, and then declares only those that
favor them. The issues that have been identified in Appellant's Brief,
are supported by documented evidence.

Much of this evidence is

available in Appellant's Appeal Brief, and can be seen in the Brief
Addendum.

Unless, and until, this evidence can be disputed through

under oath testimony, it must be assumed best evidence and accepted
as valid.
f. Appellee states on page 42. foot note #25. of Appellee's
Brief: that "Plaintiffs Federal Deposition was actually taken in March
and April of 1999."
Appellant's Reply: The Appellee's statement is an example of
how distortion, half-truths, and obfuscation used by Defendant's
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Counsel. Plaintiff and her husband were subjected to hour upon hour of
depositions for both the Federal case and the State Cases. Their
depositions for the federal case were taken on January 27, 1999,
January 28, 1999, and April 23, 1999; and for State case on, July 20,
1998 and November 20, 1998. Plaintiff was not permitted to take
even one deposition of the five defendants in the federal case.
Plaintiff's attorney was permitted to take one deposition in this State
case, and that took place after nine schedule date changes by
Defendant's counsel. It is totally unfair for Defendant's counsel to use
deposition information obtained in another court, and then deny
Plaintiff's counsel to use information from the same depositions.
It is important to note that Defendant's counsel tries to make it
appear that depositions were not taken on January 27, and 28, but
"was actually taken in March and April 23, 1999." The reason for this
intentional and misleading statement is because Defendant's counsel
does not wish the court to study Plaintiffs inclusion of January 27,
and 28, 1999 deposition excerpts that prove the deceit of Autoliv's
counsel. (Add. Exh. 4 1 , of Appellant's Brief.)
Appellant's attorney, Caine, stated in the record that he had not
seen Plaintiffs federal case deposition because it was not available to
him. This point was clearly made in Attorney Caine's, Plaintiff's Reply
To Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition filed with the Court on
August 4, 2000,

(R. 851 - 863) with Exhibit 40 and R. 764 - 863)
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CONCLUSIONS

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF has been subjected to a variety
of malicious, false, deceitful, and defamatory

employment

practices.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was maliciously accused of a
criminal acts of fraud and misrepresentation, but was never
given opportunity to challenge the accusations with
documented evidence.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was subjected to more
unsubstantiated and maliciously false statements in the
employer's efforts to deny her unemployment compensation.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was denied fair adjudication by
the Second District Court which refused her motions to
compel discovery, and to relieve excess discovery demands
placed upon her.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was subjected to rulings by a
compromised Judge who was not worthy of seat on the
Bench, and was in fact removed from the Bench.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was forced to accept rulings by
a Judge who would not review prior rulings, and who knowingly
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covered-up the removed Judge's

misconduct.

APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF has been subjected t o Utah
Courts that are totally prejudiced against employees and
particularly those who must represent themselves pro se.

THEREFORE:

The Appeal Court is requested t o return some

measure of fair adjudication by reverse and remand of this
case with instructions to reopen discovery, and then proceed
through the jury trial that was requested when the complaint
was filed, and paid for.

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
Plaintiff request Oral Argument as authorized by Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 29. Appellant/Plaintiff has placed her trust
in Utah Court's fair adjudication, realizing that legally trained attorneys
have a distinct advantage over Pro se litigants. However, she is
convinced that much of the distortion and unfairness of prior
proceedings would have been prevented if she had the opportunity to
answer Court questions based on first hand knowledge, and honesty.

Dated this JLZ. day of June 2002.
Christina M. Eddy
5011 S. 7500 W.
Hooper, Utah 84315
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Certification

of

Service

I, Renee B. Eddy hereby certify that I hand delivered two copies
of the Appellant's Reply Brief, to Attorneys below on £L'^ay of Julfife2002, to:
Janet Hugie Smith
Rick Thaler
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker
36 South State Street
Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Renee B. Eady
C & R Admin. Services
2502 S. 3500 W.
Ogden, Utah 84401
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